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WHAT DID THE 
FIRST AMENDMENT 
ORIGINALLY MEAN?
The founders’ understanding of the concept of rights  
would leave them confused by how we make decisions  
about freedom of speech today.
By Jud Campbell
Illustrations by Robert Meganck
he First Amendment says that “Congress 
shall make no law … abridging the freedom 
of speech, or of the press.” For Americans, 
this language is familiar. But what exactly 
does it mean? How far do the speech and 
press clauses restrict governmental power? 
The founders, as we will see, answered these ques-
tions very differently than we typically do today. 
And the reasons why highlight fundamental shifts 
in American constitutional thought.
At first glance, the text of the speech and press 
clauses might appear to prevent Congress from 
imposing any restrictions on expression. But this 
reading can’t be right, and it never has been. Every 
well-functioning government needs to restrict at 
least some speech. Laws against committing per-
jury, disclosing classified information, and making 
terrorist threats, for instance, all restrict “speech,” 
but no one seriously doubts their constitutionality. 
In any event, the First Amendment says only that 
Congress cannot abridge “the freedom of” speech or 
the press; it doesn’t say that Congress cannot restrict 
speech or the press at all. By itself, the text is unclear.
When faced with opaque features of our 
Constitution, judges and legal scholars often look for 
what those provisions meant when they were enacted. 
Nowadays, we typically associate this approach with 
political conservatism, and particularly the claims 
of many self-proclaimed “originalists” who aim to 
interpret the Constitution according to its “original 
meaning.” But the truth is that virtually everyone 
puts enormous weight on history. The Supreme Court 
has the power only to interpret the Constitution, not 
the power to change it, so arguments about original 
meaning have always had special force.  
With only peripheral exceptions, however, mod-
ern judicial decisions about expressive freedom do 
not consider original meaning at all. For jurists of 
all stripes, interpreting the First Amendment is a 
historical dead zone. 
T
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But why? The most straightforward reason, 
it seems, is that nobody knows what the First 
Amendment originally meant. As leading First 
Amendment scholar (and former dean of Richmond 
Law) Rodney Smolla puts it, “One can keep going 
round and round on the original meaning of the 
First Amendment, but no clear, consistent vision of 
what the framers meant by freedom of speech will 
ever emerge.” A quick look at the history reinforces 
Smolla’s point. Only a decade after the Constitution 
went into effect, Americans vehemently disagreed 
over whether Congress could pass the Sedition Act 
of 1798, which banned false and malicious criticisms 
of the federal government. If the founders couldn’t 
even agree among themselves about that type of law, 
then surely looking for the First Amendment’s “orig-
inal meaning” is like searching for the Holy Grail.
But perhaps we have framed the question in 
entirely the wrong way, seeing hopeless confusion 
where the founders would have perceived a more 
ordered disagreement. Of course, attitudes toward 
speech and press freedoms were not uniform. 
Constitutional disagreements were commonplace 
back then, just as they are today. But maybe there 
was an order to the chaos in a way that we haven’t 
previously appreciated.
The key to understanding the original meanings 
of the speech and press clauses is to step back from 
a search for the meaning of particular rights and 
instead try to appreciate how the founders thought 
about rights more generally. In other words, we’ve 
been focused on discerning an image in a single 
puzzle piece rather than looking for its place in a 
broader puzzle.
For us, a constitutional “right” is a legally enforce-
able privilege or immunity — something that the 
government has to provide us (e.g., our “right” to a 
jury trial) or something that the government cannot 
take away (e.g., our “right” to possess personal fire-
arms for self-defense). 
But American elites in the late 18th century 
understood their “rights” in a very different way. 
For the founders, rights were divided into two cat-
egories: natural rights and positive rights. Unless 
we approach the task of constitutional interpreta-
tion on their terms rather than on ours, the First 
Amendment’s original meaning will remain elusive.
Natural rights were all the things that we could 
do simply as humans, without the intervention of a 
government. As Thomas Paine once put it, “A natu-
ral right is an animal right, and the power to act it, 
is supposed … to be mechanically contained within 
ourselves as individuals.” Eating, walking, thinking, 
and praying, for instance, were all things that indi-
viduals could do without a government, so they were 
all easily identifiable as natural rights. 
Meanwhile, positive rights were defined explicitly 
in terms in governmental authority. The right to 
a jury trial and the right to 
habeas corpus, for instance, 
were positive rights because 
they were procedures provid-
ed by the government.
With these definitions in 
view, the founders had no 
need to write out long lists 
of which types of rights were 
natural and which were pos-
itive. The distinction, to 
them, was obvious. Speaking, 
writing, and publishing, for 
instance, were all things that people could do with-
out a government, so they were readily recognizable 
as natural rights. When James Madison introduced 
the Bill of Rights in the first Congress, for instance, 
he only mentioned in passing that freedom of 
speech was one of the “natural rights, retained.” 
Madison’s audience easily understood his point. 
Expression is an innate human capacity, so it is a 
natural right.
But we still haven’t quite arrived at the origi-
nal meaning of the speech and press clauses. For 
that, we need to understand how natural rights 
constrained governmental power. Surely the First 
Amendment imposes some limits on Congress. (It 
says, after all, that “Congress shall make no law … 
abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press.”) 
What were those limits?
For the founders, natural rights were rooted in a 
philosophical system called social-contract theory. 
According to this theory, the proper scope of govern-
mental authority is discoverable by first imagining 
our situation as if there were no government and 
then considering why we would come together and 
agree to form a political society through an agree-
‘… natural rights were not a set of determinate   
 legal privileges or immunities that the government  
 could not abridge. Natural rights, it bears emphasis, 
 could be restricted by law to promote the good  
 of the society.’
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ment known as a social contract. The political soci-
ety would then agree to a constitution that created a 
government and granted it certain powers. 
Although some ancillary features of social-con-
tract theory were contested, virtually every 
American political leader in the late 18th century 
agreed about its core features. Most importantly, 
the founders recognized two crucial limitations 
that social-contract theory imposes on governmen-
tal power to restrict natural rights. First, natural 
rights can be restricted only when the people them-
selves consent to the restriction, either in person or 
through their political representatives. This princi-
ple was a rallying cry for American colonists advo-
cating for independence rather than submitting to 
British taxation when they had no representation in 
Parliament. Second, the government could restrict 
natural rights only when doing so promoted the 
public good — that is, the aggregate happiness and 
welfare of the entire political society. Individuals 
entering a political society, John Locke explained 
in his widely read Second Treatise, surrender “as 
much … natural Liberty … as the Good, Prosperity, 
and Safety of the Society shall require.”
As a general matter, therefore, the concept of nat-
ural rights helped define who could restrict individ-
ual liberty (namely, a representative legislature) and 
why they could do so (namely, to promote the public 
good). But natural rights were not a set of determi-
nate legal privileges or immunities that the gov-
ernment could not abridge. Natural rights, 
it bears emphasis, could be restricted 
by law to promote the good of the 
society. “[T]he right to speak and 
act,” American patriot James Otis 
explained at the onset of the colo-
nial conflict, “is limited by the 
law — Political liberty consists 
in a freedom of speech and 
action, so far as the laws of a 
community will permit, and 
no farther.” Effectively, this put 
the legislature — not judges — 
in primary control over how 
far to restrict expression. The 
freedoms of speech and of the 
press, in other words, were a 
primarily philosophical con-
cept — not a strictly legal one.
At the same time, the 
founders also appreciated 
that certain regulations 
of speech were not in 
the public interest and 
were, therefore, beyond the scope of legislative 
power. The famous “rule against prior restraints” — 
prohibiting the government from requiring preap-
proval of publications — is one example. Another is 
that well-intentioned criticisms of the government 
could not be punished. (Deliberate efforts to mis-
lead the public were an entirely different matter.) 
The First Amendment thus prevented temporary 
legislative majorities from abandoning these settled 
principles. 
How much further the speech and press clauses 
went, though, was up for debate precisely because 
the founders often disagreed about exactly what 
restrictions of expression promoted the public good. 
This conflict was especially clear in the late 1790s as 
Americans clashed over the constitutionality of the 
federal Sedition Act. 
Members of the Federalist Party — the party of 
President John Adams — argued that maintaining 
a republican government required punishing those 
who falsely and maliciously criticized the govern-
ment. “[E]very individual is at liberty to expose, in 
the strongest terms, consistent with decency and 
truth all the errors of any department of the govern-
ment,” Federalist jurist Alexander Addison wrote. 
But this hardly implied constitutional protection 
for deliberately misleading the public. “Because the 
Constitution guaranties the right of expressing our 
opinions, and the freedom of the 
press,” Federalist congressman 
John Allen asked rhetorically, 
“am I at liberty to falsely call 
you a thief, a murderer, an 
atheist?” Stopping the spread 
of lies, Federalists insisted, was 
essential to maintaining a well-in-
formed electorate and, thus, a repub-
lican government.
In response, Jeffersonian-Republican 
opponents of the Sedition Act did not 
even try to defend the notion that all 
speech is beneficial. “It may perhaps be 
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urged, and plausibly urged, that the welfare of the 
community may sometimes, and in some cases, 
require certain restrictions on [an] unlimited right 
of enquiry,” Elizabeth Ryland Priestley wrote. The 
problem for Republicans, however, was the prospect 
of governmental abuses of power. Authority to pun-
ish sedition, Priestley explained, “once conceded, 
may be extended to every [opinion] which insidious 
despotism may think fit to hold out as dangerous.” 
In other words, Republicans still assessed questions 
of free speech in terms of the public good — the 
core principle set out by the First Amendment — 
but Republicans were worried that Federalists were 
pursuing their own narrow partisan interests rather 
than the general welfare and that these abuses of 
power would stifle useful public debate.
In sum, the founders thought that the First 
Amendment required Congress to restrict speech 
and the press only in promotion of the public good, 
while also guaranteeing more specific legal rules 
that had long protected expressive freedom. The 
amendment, in other words, stood for a general 
principle — one that left room for considerable 
debate about how it should be applied in practice — 
and also for the entrenchment of more specific set-
tled principles. The speech and press clauses thus 
shaped debate about expressive freedom while also 
standing as bulwarks against constitutional back-
sliding. The amendment was not simply a count-
er-majoritarian limit on legislative power. However, 
once the people agreed on core features of expres-
sive freedom, the legislature could not turn back. 
This process of accumulating and refining consti-
tutional principles over time through political means 
is foreign to us. Rights in the modern sense are count-
er-majoritarian limits on legislative power, so it seems 
strange that their scope could somehow depend on 
political decisions. For us, judges have that job.
For people born and raised in the tradition of the 
customary British constitution, however, the logic 
of recognizing constitutional limits through politi-
cal rather than judicial means makes perfect sense. 
“[C]ustomary law carries with it the most unquestion-
able proofs of freedom,” explained James Wilson, a 
delegate to the Constitutional Convention and later 
Supreme Court justice. Politicians do abuse power, 
of course. But for the founders, once legislators agree 
on a constitutional principle, and once that settle-
ment remains in place for some time, the principle 
becomes binding. “[L]ong and uniform custom,” 
English jurist Richard Wooddeson noted in 1792, 
“bestows a sanction, as evidence of universal appro-
bation and acquiescence.” It was, in other words, as 
if the people themselves had spoken. 
For the drafters of the Bill of Rights, the First 
Amendment fit within this familiar tradition. Well-
established principles about expressive freedom 
would limit Congress, and judges and juries could 
enforce these settled boundaries of governmental 
authority. But, otherwise, the First Amendment 
would leave the task of defining the public good to 
the people and their representatives. For the found-
ers, judges could not create new limits on govern-
mental authority. That development came a century 
and a half later as the Supreme Court began to strike 
down state and federal restrictions of speech in the 
1930s. The vision embraced by the justices was still 
evolutionary — recognizing new constitutional prin-
ciples over time. But going forward, courts, rather 
than legislatures, assumed primary responsibility 
for determining the scope of constitutionally enu-
merated natural rights. 
This is when we began to lose touch with this part 
of our constitutional past. The rights recognized in 
the Bill of Rights all started looking the same, with-
out distinctions between natural rights and positive 
rights. All of these rights, in turn, became trump 
cards that individuals began to play against legis-
lative claims to the common good. Political settle-
ments no longer mattered; judges were now supreme 
exponents of the Constitution. Questions of policy 
— questions about what types of laws promoted the 
general welfare — transformed into an abstruse web 
of legal doctrines. Rather that promoting engaged 
civil debate in the political sphere, invoking “rights” 
is now a way of shutting that debate down.
Perhaps the way the founders understood the 
First Amendment is ill-suited for our modern world, 
where distrust and disdain for politics constant-
ly seems to reach new heights. From abortion 
restrictions to gun-control laws to limits on speech, 
Americans by and large look to courts, rather than 
to ourselves and our political representatives, to 
define and protect our rights. Constitutionally 
speaking, we live in a different world. Perhaps we 
can’t or shouldn’t go back. But at the very least, 
history can help open our minds to new ways of 
thinking and help us appreciate the foreignness of 
our constitutional past. 
Rights were not always claims against the public 
good, and judges were not always the ones who 
decided their full scope. Where we go from here is 
up to us. ■
Jud Campbell is an assistant professor at University of 
Richmond School of Law. 
